Earlier this year, I wrote about the then-proposed changes to the Federal Rules, and how those changes (if implemented), could impact electronic discovery. (February 15, 2017 blog)  Well, the time has come — effective December 1, 2017, the amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 902 “Evidence That is Self Authenticating” went live.

As the title suggests, Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 902 applies to evidence that is self-authenticating (i.e., sealed and signed public documents, certified copies of public records, newspapers).  Because such documents are deemed “self-authenticating,” attorneys do not need to go through the authentication process in court with qualified expert testimony.  Effective December 1st, two new categories of documents will qualify as self-authenticating, too.

Specifically, 902(13) and (14) are the newly added provisions – each of which apply to electronically stored documents.

Subsection 13 provides:

(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System. A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

And, subsection (14) provides:

(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File. Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 3 identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

Subsection (13) applies to machine-generated information (i.e., produced by a computer system or computer process) and is analogous to Rule 902(11)’s certification of business records.  Subsection (14) applies more broadly to copied/replicated ESI provided the copy retains a hash value that is identical to the original.[1] Subsection 14, thus, effectively dispenses with the costly need for trial testimony of a forensic or technical expert where best practices are employed, as certified through a written affidavit by a “qualified person.”

While neither subsection (13) nor (14) dispense with the need to demonstrate authenticity, the new provisions drastically simplify the process.  Indeed, the expectation is that the new Rules will provide a streamlined and efficient process to establish a foundation for ESI collected in a Rule 902(14) compliant manner. This will increase predictability by eliminating surprise challenges, and will encourage the use of ESI practitioners by allowing written certifications in the place of expensive and time-intensive in-person testimony.  Indeed, the ability to eliminate foundational testimony will undeniably result in significant cost savings to one’s client and help promote judicial efficiency.[2]

[1] Recall, a file’s hash value is often likened to its fingerprint – a unique identifier attributable to the contents of a file being processed through a cryptographic algorithm, which results in a unique numerical value – the hash value – being produced that identifies the contents of the file.

[2]  However, this necessarily presupposes that practitioners in the federal courts will understand what a 902(14) compliant collection means.

In Arrowhead Capital Fin. Ltd. v. Seven Arts Entertainment, Inc. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126545 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2016), District Judge Katherine Polk Failla imposed significant sanctions upon both the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and the lawyer for defendant Seven Arts Entertainment Inc. (“SAE”).

Background

Arrowhead Capital Finance, Ltd. (“Arrowhead”) sued SAE in 2014 seeking to enforce a judgment it had little ability to enforce because all of the assets held by the debtor had been sold to SAE.  SAE filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Court lacked personal jurisdiction.  The Court denied the motion pending discovery.

In a letter dated September 21, 2015, Plaintiff claimed SAE and its counsel had engaged in various misconduct during discovery.  The violations alleged to have been undertaken to slow down discovery included:

  • SAE inflated their document productions with nonresponsive documents;
  • SAE refused to produce critical responsive documents;
  • SAE’s discovery responses were incomplete and replete with improper objections; and
  • SAE refused to produce key witnesses for deposition.

The Court held a conference to address Arrowhead’s complaints.  During that conference, SAE’s counsel acknowledged he had not reviewed the discovery responses interposed by his client and merely forwarded to his attorney the materials he received from SAE’s CEO.

As a result of this admission, the Court stated it had no confidence SAE would meet its discovery obligations and ordered SAE’s CEO to personally appear to testify concerning the alleged misconduct.  The Court also ordered SAE to produce the responsive documents Arrowhead requested but never received.

Notwithstanding the Court’s various orders, SAE refused to produce witnesses for deposition or produce the required documents.

Because the Court deemed SAE’s CEO to be directing counsel not to comply with the Court’s orders, Arrowhead moved for sanctions.  In response, the CEO testified his offices were “paperless” and the third-party server upon which documents were maintained was destroyed as a result of SAE’s failure to pay its bills (which he claimed was unintentional).  The CEO also cast blame on various staff people to whom he had purportedly delegated the task of complying with the Court’s orders.

The Court concluded SAE was willfully making misrepresentations to the Court and showed “flagrant disregard for” Court orders for the purpose of withholding information from Arrowhead.  As a result, the Court held SAE forfeited its jurisdictional arguments due to non-compliance with Court orders.  The Court further determined a spoliation instruction would be provided in connection with any claims ultimately submitted to the jury.  Defendants’ CEO also was ordered to pay Arrowhead’s costs in association with bringing its various motions and was ordered to retain separate legal counsel to conduct a thorough review of SAE’s files to assess whether additional responsive information remained to be produced.  Defendants’ counsel, who was deemed complicit in the violations,  was ordered to pay a portion of Plaintiff’s costs.

Conclusion

This decision reinforces that counsel may not turn a blind eye to a client’s behavior nor may counsel simply follow the instructions of clients.  Rather, counsel has a duty to ensure that good faith efforts are taken to comply with discovery obligations.  This case also reminds us that the amended Rule 37(e) does not lessen punishments for willful or intentional e-discovery misconduct.  Rather, bad faith behavior will be met with sanctions, not only for the party, but for counsel as well.

On October 4, 2016, District Judge Jon S. Tigar issued an opinion every federal court practitioner should read (Rodman v Safeway, Inc., [11-cv-03003] [N.D. Ca.] [JST]).  The decision serves as an important reminder that counsel has an obligation to assist their client when identifying and collecting  electronic documents responsive to discovery demands.  Indeed, it is not sufficient or defensible to have a non-IT savvy individual search electronic media for responsive materials and to do so without meaningful oversight and involvement of counsel.

The Rodman case is a certified class action for breach of contract.   Defendant, Safeway, Inc. (“Safeway”), entered with customers an online contract that determined pricing and delivery fees associated with online grocery shopping.  The essence of the allegations before the Court were that Safeway breached the contract by charging prices on Safeway.com that were materially different than those charged (for the same items) in the physical store from which the groceries were selected and delivered.

After multiple summary judgment motions, one issue remained for trial: whether class members who registered for the delivery service prior to 2006 agreed to the same contract as class members who registered after 2006?    As a result of this remaining issue, class representative Rodman requested documents showing the terms and conditions and registration process in effect from 2001 through 2005 (“Special Terms”).  On March 9, 2015, Safeway responded to this discovery demand advising that it did not have access to the Special Terms and subsequently reported (on April 7, 2015) that it could not locate any documents responsive to this request.

Seven days before trial, Safeway produced 10 highly responsive documents related to Safeway’s Special Terms.  These documents were found on a “legacy” hard drive and were found by Safeway’s Director of Marketing – Steve Guthrie – when he was prepping for the trial (more than 5 months after discovery closed).   Guthrie – who was designated to testify concerning all steps taken to locate documents and persons knowledgeable about the pre-2006 processes and Special Terms, previously testified that he had searched the legacy hard drive using “key word searches” and did not locate any responsive documents.    

Given the highly relevant nature of the documents produced, the Court continued trial for two months and permitted Plaintiff to take additional discovery.  Eventually, a judgment was entered against Safeway. That judgment is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.  

On April 6, 2016, however, and as is relevant to this blog, Rodman filed a motion for discovery sanctions.  Judge Tigar’s decision, granting in part and denying in part the sanction motion, entered on October 4, 2016, imposed a sanction in the amount of $516,484.00 against Safeway.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR DISCOVERY

In reaching its decision, the Court began by reciting the standard under FRCP 26(g) – that a “signing attorney [must] certify that a reasonable inquiry has been made with respect to the factual and legal basis for any discovery request or response.”  The Court further found that when an attorney makes a certification that violates this rule and does so without “substantial justification,” the Court “must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both.” (Rule 26(g)(3)). (emphasis added).

Plaintiff moved for sanctions based upon Safeway’s false statement that no documents responsive to his demand for the pre ’06 Special Terms existed.  Safeway responded that sanctions were not warranted because it made a reasonable inquiry into the basis for its response, including interviewing individuals, and searching the legacy drive for documents.  Safeway argued these steps were comprehensive and thus reasonable.

The Court disagreed and concluded that Safeway’s initial search of the legacy drive was unreasonable for at least three reasons.

First, the Court found “there [was] no indication that Safeway’s counsel guided or monitored Mr. Guthrie’s search of the legacy drive in any significant way.”  Rather, counsel relied on Guthrie’s own determination and seems not to have questioned the thoroughness of Guthrie’s search.  The Court found this “lack of guidance and oversight sufficient to “support” a finding of unreasonableness.”

Second, because there is no evidence that Guthrie had any experience in conducting searches of large document repositories, such as the approximately 300 GB legacy drive, the search was unreasonable.  Indeed, the Court found that Safeway’s counsel could have, but failed to, request a member of Safeway’s IT department (or anyone else familiar with modern e-discovery) conduct the search.

Third, the evidence indicates the search was objectively unreasonable. For example, this was not the case of Safeway being asked to locate the proverbial needle in a haystack.  Rather, many of the electronic file folders (now known to contain the responsive documents) had names like, “Special Terms,”  and “OldSiteDesign” – names that should have signaled to anyone conducting an adequate search that the folder was likely target rich.  Instead, Mr. Guthrie searched for the key words only in a file’s name (rather than in the body of, or content of the file or folder).  This too, shows counsel failed to guide, monitor or inform what Guthrie did.

Clearly if we are to internalize any lesson from this decision it is the obligation of counsel to actively participate in the discovery process.  We cannot allow our client(s)/clients’ employees to collect responsive information in a vacuum.  Rather, we must actively participate in the process and we must secure the expertise of individuals steeped in modern e-discovery when we or client lacks the expertise.  In fashioning the one half-million dollar sanction, the Court found it telling that a substantial part of the legal work Plaintiff sought the cost of performing (additional discovery, unnecessary trial preparation.) would have been avoided had a reasonable search – meaningfully informed by counsel – been conducted on the legacy drive.

 

In Hyles v. New York City et. al., (Case No. 10-3119, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100390 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016], the plaintiff, an African-American female employed by the City of New York, was demoted.  Specifically, she was replaced by a white male and demoted to a different position with a lesser salary.  Ultimately, plaintiff sued the City for discrimination and a hostile work environment under various federal statutes.

Discovery in the case was unnecessarily protracted for a number of reasons including a temporary stay and attendant delays due to mediation, motion practice, and what the Court called, a “lack of effort by counsel.” Eventually, a discovery conference was held before Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck after counsel for both parties jointly requested the Court resolve various discovery disputes.  As is relevant to this blog, the parties requested the Judge determine the scope of electronic discovery regarding: (a) custodians, (b) the date range to be searched, and (c) search methodology to be utilized.  Regarding the issue of search methodology, the City sought to use keyword searches designed to identify potentially responsive materials.  Plaintiff, on the other hand, requested the Court compel the City to use a form of technology assisted review (“TAR”) to perform the City’s search for potentially responsive materials.  In seeking to compel the City, plaintiff asserted that TAR is the more cost effective and efficient way to obtain discovery.   The City, in opposition, argued that the cost of TAR was too much and, because the parties failed to collaborate well in the past they “would not be able to collaborate to develop the seed set for a TAR process.”

In response to the plaintiff’s argument that the use of TAR would be the most efficient and cost effective, Judge Peck agreed stating “the Court believes that for most cases today, TAR is the best and most efficient search tool,” finding it “superior” to key word searching and noting, “[t]he Court would have liked the City to use TAR in this case”.  However, citing Sedona Conference Principle 6, Judge Peck held that “the responding party is best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own [ESI].”

Judge Peck noted that someday, the law may be at the point where “it might be unreasonable for a party to decline to use TAR… [but,] [w]e are not there yet.” Hyles, supra, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100390 . at *9-*10.  Therefore, the Court denied plaintiff’s application to force defendant to use  predictive coding.

It is interesting to note the ever-growing trend among federal judges to embrace TAR as an effective way to contain costs and engage in an efficient discovery process.  While it is true that the state of the law currently allows the responding party to determine how best to identify potentially responsive data such that the party can comply with its discovery obligations, I predict (no pun intended) that more and more parties – when faced with the potentially tremendous financial costs attendant to e-discovery – may soon turn to various TAR methodologies if only as a means to control costs.

Mobile Telecomms. Techs., LLC, v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 2015 WL 5719123, (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2015)

In this patent infringement case, M-Tel contested a prior ruling by the District Court, which held that Samsung had not infringed upon patents owned by M-Tel. M-Tel claimed that Samsung was not the prevailing party as both the plaintiff and defendant won on certain of the underlying claims (MTel obtained a jury finding that its patents were not invalid, and Samsung obtained a jury verdict of no infringement), and, as a result, because both parties “prevailed” in part, M-Tel was entitled to recover on document production costs.

Although a unique argument, the District Court disagreed with M-Tel.  The Court stated that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 does not allow every party that prevails on some claim to be deemed a “prevailing party.”  Indeed, the Court noted that Rule 54 has no special rule or exception for mixed judgment cases, where both parties have some claims decided in their favor.  Rather, calling upon the Shum v. Intel Corp. case (629 F.3d 1360, 1367 [Fed. Cir. 2010]), the Court noted that where, as here, there was a mixed judgment, “punting [wa]s not an option;…[f]or the purposes of costs and fees, there can be only one winner” and only the prevailing party – meaning the party who wins on a claim that “materially alter[s] the legal relationship” between the plaintiff and defendant, can receive costs.

Here, the Court determined, under that standard, that Samsung was the prevailing party.

However, the Court, calling upon 28 U.S.C. § 1920, found that, in regards to recovering electronic production costs, Samsung could only recover the costs associated with “making copies” of any materials where the copies were necessarily obtained for use in the case, which includes only the electronic document production steps that “are, in fact, necessary to make copies of information requested…and not incurred just to make copies for the convenience of the producing party.”   As such, the Court held that the defendant could recover against the plaintiff for producing the necessary documents, but not for the costs the defendant incurred in utilizing other services that were not necessary for production including the “OCR costs incurred” as part of Samsung’s document production to MTel because Samsung “has not shown that this step was necessary for making copies” and neither party cited controlling authority holding that the Court may award OCR costs under § 1920.

The Court further noted its conclusion was consistent with its own Court’s standing order, which states: “Electronic discovery costs are generally not allowed, including costs for document collection, document processing, and document hosting.”

Because the case law interpreting what falls within the statute’s ambit of “making copies” is still developing, practitioners should be explicit in their joint discovery plan and state precisely which of their e-discovery costs are recoverable if they prevail in the suit.  As we all know, the lion’s share of the costs associated with e-discovery are not pure copying costs.  Rather, critical needs such as collecting, processing, hosting, and reviewing (did I mention reviewing?) the documents are the larger source of e-discovery costs.

Earlier this summer, the California State Bar formally addressed the ethical obligations of counsel to be competent in matters of e-discovery and specifically established standards for counsel practicing in California.  (Formal Opinion No. 2015-193).  The Bar stated, “[e]lectronic document creation and/or storage, and electronic communications, have become commonplace in modern life…attorneys who handle litigation may not ignore the requirements and obligations of electronic discovery. A lack of technological knowledge in handling ediscovery may render an attorney ethically incompetent to handle certain litigation matters involving ediscovery, absent curative assistance.”  The Opinion went on to note that an attorney lacking the required competence for e-discovery issues has three options: (1) acquire sufficient learning and skill before performance is required; (2) associate with or consult technical consultants or competent counsel; or (3) decline the client representation. Lack of competence in e-discovery issues also may lead to an ethical violation of an attorney’s duty of confidentiality.

Although the State Bar’s Opinion is advisory only, it provides much needed structure in a field that has historically been faced with varied interpretations and even more varied levels of competence in the field.  Set within the parameters of a hypothetical bar exam question, the Opinion went on to discuss the 9 defined skills that attorneys should be able to perform in ediscovery (either “by themselves or in association with competent co-counsel”):

  1. Initially assess ediscovery needs and issues, if any;
  2. Implement/cause to implement appropriate ESI preservation procedures;
  3. Analyze and understand a client’s ESI systems and storage;
  4. Advise the client on available options for collection and preservation of ESI;
  5. Identify custodians of potentially relevant ESI;
  6. Engage in competent and meaningful meet and confer with opposing counsel concerning an ediscovery plan;
  7. Perform data searches;
  8. Collect responsive ESI in a manner that preserves the integrity of that ESI;
  9. Produce responsive non-privileged ESI in a recognized and appropriate manner.

Irrespective of whether the New York State Bar follows California’s lead, it is nonetheless critical for practicing attorneys (litigators in particular) to understand the intricacies of the ediscovery landscape and our many obligations in this area.   Ultimately, attorneys’ obligations evolve as new technologies develop and become integrated with the practice of law. Make sure you are staying up to speed!

In a previous post we discussed generally the idea of a cooperative discovery process and highlighted how the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules embrace this principal (see, e.g., proposed amendments to Federal Rule Civil Procedure [“FRCP”] 1).  Here, we discuss how the concept of a cooperative discovery process– even apart from the specific mandates in the FRCP – is expected by the Courts.

Consider, for example, the several districts that have adopted local rules and standards for e-discovery that promote cooperation.  In the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, for example, “[c]ounsel are expected to cooperate with each other, consistent with the interests of their clients, in all phases of the discovery process” (Local Rule 26.4).  Additionally, the Seventh Circuit, the Southern District of Illinois, the Northern District of California, and other federal Courts have adopted similar rules and guidelines. And, as recent developments in case law have shown (see, e.g., Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee, 2014 WL 3851157 [N.D. Cal. 2014]), counsel is wise to adopt a cooperative approach to the discovery process.  Indeed, clients are best served by an attorney who is a master of dialogue rather than simply a master of debate.

In Boston Scientific, the Company brought suit against a former employee who began employment with a competitor immediately after resigning from Boston Scientific.  The new employer, after learning about the lawsuit, segregated defendant’s laptop and sent it to a third party e-discovery vendor.  Plaintiff sought forensic images of two laptops; the first that was initially segregated and a replacement laptop, both of which the former employee had been using.  As confirmed by the vendor, the second laptop contained trade secrets and other confidential information from a previous user. When the employer offered to have the first laptop reviewed for pertinent information, Boston Scientific declined the offer.   Thereafter, the court held that neither laptop was discoverable.  Not surprisingly, in the face of this ruling Boston Scientific sought promptly to accept the previous offer which the court would not allow.  The court notably stated:

“This case illustrates a recurring problem in all civil discovery, … A party demands the sun, moon and stars in a document request or interrogatory, refusing to give even a little bit. The meet and confer required by a court in advance of a motion is perfunctory at best, with no compromise whatsoever. But when the parties appear before the court, the recalcitrant party possesses newfound flexibility and a willingness to compromise. Think Eddie Haskell singing the Beaver’s praises to June Cleaver, only moments after giving him the business in private.”

Here, had counsel for Boston Scientific engaged in a cooperative approach to the discovery process, undoubtedly Boston Scientific would have been better served and likely counsel would have maintained credibility in the eyes of the Court.*

*For other decisional law illustrating the Courts’ frustrations with obstreperous or unreasonable discovery anticssee also Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd., 2014 WL 2987051 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Straight Path IP Group, Inc. v. Blackberry Ltd., 2014 WL 3401723 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 1909260 (E.D. Pa. 2014).

As those of you reading this well know, many studies and decisions show continued dissatisfaction with the discovery process. Remedies to this dissatisfaction that have gained traction are the ideas of cooperation, proportionality and reasonableness in the discovery process – the very themes that lay at the heart of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules.

On April 29, 2015, in a letter to the United States Senate and House of Representatives, Chief Justice John Roberts submitted the proposed amendments to the FRCP for final congressional approval.  Specifically, C.J. Roberts stated that the amendments “[H]ave been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  This means, absent any legislation to reject or modify the proposed rules, they will become effective December 1, 2015.

Indeed, unless modified by an act of Congress, several new civil procedure rules will be effective this year, certain of which will impact discovery generally, including e-discovery.

For example, as amended, FRCP 37(e) seeks to impose a uniform standard relating to the remedies available by a court when ESI is not properly preserved and prejudice to the impacted party is found.  These remedies are, adverse inference, jury instruction or dismissal.  Rule 37(e), however, is applicable only when three criteria are met: (1) ESI is lost that “should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation;” (2) because of a failure to take “reasonable steps;” and (3) the loss cannot be remedied by “additional discovery” designed to replace or restore the ESI.

Other FRCP amendments emphasize the recurring themes of the importance of cooperation, proportionality, and reasonableness in and the discovery process.  For example, FRCP 1 seeks to emphasize the need for cooperative advocacy in discovery.  Specifically, the proposed amendment specifies that clients share in the responsibility with the Court for achieving the Rule’s objective:

“[These rules] should be construed, and administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” The idea behind the amendment to Rule 1 is that the express reference to the litigants in the rule itself will prompt litigants and their lawyers to engage in more cooperative behavior.

While it may take more effort to engage in a cooperative, proportional and reasonable discovery process, doing so offers a multitude of benefits for attorneys and their clients, not the least of which may be a less expensive discovery process (i.e., fewer discovery disputes, limited motion practice, decreased potential for sanctions).

A little more than three years ago, federal Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck (SDNY), issued a seminal decision in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, 11 Civ. 1279 (February 24, 2012).  Indeed, in that ruling, Judge Peck sent a message that predictive coding and computer assisted review is an appropriate tool that should be “seriously considered for use” in large data-volume cases and attorneys “no longer have to worry about being the ‘first’ or ‘guinea pig’ for judicial acceptance of computer-assisted review.”    Judge Peck went on to encourage parties to cooperate with one another and to consider disclosing the initial “seed” sets of documents.  In doing so, he recognized that sharing of seed sets is often frowned upon by counselors who argue that these sets often contain information wholly unrelated to the action, much of which may be confidential or sensitive.  Specifically Judge Peck stated: “This Court highly recommends that counsel in future cases be willing to at least discuss, if not agree to, such transparency [with seed sets] in the computer-assisted review process.”

Since Da Silva,  many cases have successfully employed various forms of technology assisted review (“TAR”) to limit the scope of documents actually reviewed by attorneys.  It is well-embraced that the upside of utilizing TAR is to make document review a more manageable and affordable task.  Moreover, Courts routinely embrace TAR for document review  See, e.g., Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., S.D.N.Y. No. 14 Civ. 3042 (RMB)(AJP) (March 3, 2015) (“the case law has developed to the point that it is now black letter law that where the producing party wants to utilize TAR for document review, courts will permit it”).

In Rio Tinto, Judge Peck revisited his DaSilva decision. And, while most of Rio Tinto discusses the merits of transparency and cooperation in the development of seed sets, Judge Peck notes there is no definitive answer on the extent of transparency and cooperation required.   Citing to his opinion in DaSilva and other cases, Judge Peck makes clear that he “generally believe[s] in cooperation” in connection with seed set development. Nevertheless, Judge Peck notes there is no absolute requirement of transparent cooperation.  Rather, “requesting parties can insure that training and review was done appropriately by other means, such as statistical estimation of recall at the conclusion of the review as well as by whether there are gaps in the production, and quality control review of samples from the documents categorized as now responsive.” (emphasis added)

The decision goes on to emphasize that courts and litigants should not hold predictive coding to a so-called “higher standard” than keyword searches or linear review. Such a standard could very well dissuade counsel and clients from using predictive coding, which would be a step backward for discovery practice overall.